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Schwartz: Supreme Court Developments

SUPREME COURT SECTION 1983
DEVELOPMENTS
MartinA. Schwartz"

The Supreme Court was very active last term in the area of
Section 1983' litigation, and I think that, looking at the Section

1983 decisions from last term as a group, what is unique about
them is that they send out an unusual number of important messages
to litigators and judges who handle Section 1983 cases.
I have grouped the cases for discussion purposes into five areas:
1) subject matter jurisdiction; 2) substantive due process; 3)
prosecutorial immunity; 4) legislative immunity; and 5) qualified
immunity.

* Professor Martin A. Schwartz is highly accomplished in the field of § 1933
litigation and, among other things, is author of a leading treatise entitled
Section 1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses (3d ed. 1997) and Section 1983
Litigation:FederalEvidence (2d ed. 1995). In addition, Professor Schwartz is
the author of a monthly column in the New York.Law Journal, "Public Interest
Law." Professor Schwartz has also been the co-chair of the Practicing Law
Institute Program on § 1983 litigation for fourteen years.
** Professor Schwartz acknowledges the valuable assistance of Jonathan
Stein in the preparation of this article.
'42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This section reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Id.

1483
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I. SUBJECr MATlER JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court heard two cases last term dealing with the
removal of Section 1983 actions from state to federal court. This is
an issue of obvious strategic importance, because if the state court
defendant is able to remove the case from state to federal court, it
effectively takes away the choice of forum that originally belonged
to the plaintiff.
If the Section 1983 claim is the only claim asserted in the state
court action, there is no problem. The state complaint is clearly
removable to federal court, since the action could have been
brought in federal court in the first instance. 2 Complications arise
when the state court complaint asserts not only a Section 1983
claim, but, for example, a pendent state law claim as well. In
addition, what happens if the Section 1983 claim is asserted
together with a claim that might be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment? 3 These issues created much difficulty for lower
federal courts. Last term, the Supreme Court cleared up a good
deal of the confusion and disagreement.
In City of Chicago v. The International College of Surgeons, the
Supreme Court held that when a state court complaint alleges both a
federal constitutional claim authorized by Section 1983, and a state
law judicial review claim, the action is removable to the federal
courts.5 If that does not sound exciting, one has only to turn to
228 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). This section reads in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district
court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending. Id.
3
U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Eleventh Amendment provides:
"The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." Id.
411g S. Ct. 523 (1997).
5
1d. at 534 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Justice Ginsburg's dissent, in which she described the majority's
opinion as a watershed decision.6
Justice Ginsburg described the decision as a landmark result,
because the ability to remove the judicial review claim from state to
federal court potentially enables federal courts to carry out the
function of judicial review of state and local administrative action.7
That function historically has been the overwhelming function, if
not the sole function, of the state courts.8
In holding that the case was removable to federal court, the
Supreme Court rejected the position of the Seventh Circuit which
held that judicial review of an administrative agency action is akin
to an appellate function that is not compatible with the original
jurisdiction of the district courts. 9 The Supreme Court, however,
rejected that rationale, and reasoned that the presence of the federal
constitutional claim, the Section 1983 claim, made the action a
"civil action" within the meaning of the federal removal statutes.' 0
Furthermore, the state judicial review claim comes within the
district court's supplemental jurisdiction."

As I read the opinion, the Court made three important points
concerning supplemental jurisdiction. First, the Court found no
intent by Congress in Section 136712 (the supplemental jurisdiction
statute) to exclude judicial review claims from the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction. 3 Second, the Court explained that
6

!d. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

'id. at 537 (Ginsburg, I., dissenting).
8

Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 91 F.3d 981, 991 (7th
Cir. 1996).
'oCity of Chicago, 118 S. Ct. at 529.
"Id. at 531.
1228 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). The statute provides in pertinent part:
[ln any civil action of which the district Courts have original
9

jurisdiction, the district Courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims

in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article I of the

United States Constitution.
Id.

13City of Chicago, 522

U.S. at 530-31.
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Section 1983 applies in the same manner, whether the case is
originally filed in federal court, or as in the City of Chicago case, it
is filed in state court and then removed to federal court. 4 Finally,
the Court stated that Section 1983 codifies the United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs 5 principles of pendent jurisdiction, the principle of power
to hear the pendent claim, and discretion whether to hear it. 16
To say that the district court has jurisdiction to hear the judicial
review claim is not the same as saying that the district court must
hear that claim. The district court could exercise its discretion
under Section 1367 and choose to decline supplemental jurisdiction
over the pendent claim. The Court in City of Chicago also pointed
out that the district court might, in an appropriate case, decide that
the judicial review claim should be subjected to one or more of the
abstention doctrines. 7
The second removal case was Wisconsin Department of
Corrections v. Schacht."8 The issue in Schacht was: what happens
if you have a state court complaint that asserts a Section 1983
personal capacity claim and a second claim against the state entity
which, if originally asserted in federal court, would be barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. 9 The United States Supreme Court held
that this type of state court complaint is also removable to federal
court, and that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to
14ld.

at 530.
'" 383 U.S. 715 (1966). In United Mine Workers, the Supreme Court held
that:
The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the Court. The state and
federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact. But if, considered without regard to there
federal or state character, a plaintiffs claims are such that he
would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal
issues, there is power in federal Courts to hear the whole.
(citations omitted).
Id. at 725.
' 6 City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 530.
17id.

' 118 S. Ct. 2047 (1998).
19Id.
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hear the non-barred claims, in this case the personal capacity
claim.- This holding resolves a split in the circuits. There was
circuit court authority, in particular the Seventh Circuit, holding
that, if even one claim in the case was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, the whole action had to be remanded back to state
court. 2

In finding the case removable, the Supreme Court stressed that the
Eleventh Amendment is only a potential defense, and not the type
of defense which defeats the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal court.' Since it is only a potential defense the state might
choose, in a particular case, to forgo the Eleventh Amendment
defense and defend the case on the merits z3 While this is a
theoretical possibility, it is not likely to occur. The Court also
pointed out that the district court is not obligated to raise the
4
Eleventh Amendment defense on its own motion.?
Justice Kennedy brought out an interesting point in his
concurrence- 5 He stated that there is an important issue here that
should be resolved in a future case, that is, when a state removes a
state court action to federal court, should the removal operate as a
waiver of the state's Eleventh Amendment defense?" The lower
court authority on this point is not consistent. At first blush it
would certainly seem that when a state removes a case from state to
federal court, it should operate as a waiver of an immunity defense
that is only available in the federal courts. But most lower courts
hold that such a removal by the state does not constitute a waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity?8 I think we should be looking for
a Supreme Court decision resolving this issue in the near future.
20 Id.

21

at 2054.

See Schacht v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 116 F.3d 1151 (7th

Cir. 1997).
2Id. at 2053-54.
3Id. at 2054.
2 Id. at 2052.

'Id. at 2054 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
' Id. at 2055 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
27 See MB MARTIN A. ScHwARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983
LGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 8.11 (3d ed. 1997).

2

Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 4 [1999], Art. 14

1488

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 15

In Heck v. Humphrey," the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
who seeks damages in federal court based upon an allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or sentence cannot do so until the
conviction or sentence has been overturned.' Heck has generated
all kinds of problems. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in
Heck, took the position that a Section 1983 plaintiff must overturn
her conviction or sentence before asserting a Section 1983 claim for
damages even if she is not in custody, because, for example, she
had only been fined or placed on probation or her sentence had
31
expired.
Last term, in Spencer v. Kemna,32 five Justices took the position
that the rule of Heck v. Humphrey should not apply when dealing
with a plaintiff who is not in custody.33 These Justices reasoned
that if the plaintiff is not in custody, the plaintiff does not have
habeas corpus available as a potential remedy to attack the
conviction or sentence. The interesting issue here is whether this
is going to be regarded as dicta or as a holding by the lower courts.
There is a First Circuit decision which states that it is dicta, and that
the concurring and dissenting Justices in Spencer v. Kemna only
articulated their individual views and thus the courts do not have to
follow that aspect of the decision.35 There is a district court
opinion, however, which says that it might be dicta, but five is
29512 U.S. 477 (1994).
30 Id. at 486-87. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:
In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal Court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. (footnotes omitted).
Id.
31 Id.

32118 S. Ct. 978 (1998).
" Id. at 989-91 (Justices Souter, O'Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer concurring,
and Justice Stevens dissenting, agreed with this position).
34 id.
35Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998).
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more
than four, and since I agree with it anyway, I am going follow
it.3
II. SUBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS
The big constitutional case last year for Section 1983 litigators
was County of Sacramento v. LewisY This is a case that most
people would agree has tragic facts. Two deputy sheriffs in patrol
cars ordered a motorcycle driven by an eighteen year old, Brian
Willard, to stop.' A sixteen year old boy, Philip Lewis was a
passenger on the motorcycle.
The deputies turned on their
flashing lights and sent out commands to stop, but the motorcycle
did not stop.' A chase ensued, escalating to speeds of up to 100
miles per hour.4' The motorcycle attempted a sharp left turn, the
deputy sheriff in the patrol car applied the brakes, but his car
skidded into the motorcycle. 42 The driver of the motorcycle,
Willard, got out of the way, but Lewis did not." The patrol car ran
into Lewis sending him flying seventy feet."
Lewis was
pronounced dead at the scene."
Lewis' parents brought suit under Section 1983, alleging that their
son had been deprived of his liberty in violation of substantive due
process." It is important to understand that substantive due process
was the only constitutional claim available to the plaintiff. No
Fourth Amendmentr claim was available since there was no
36See Zupan

v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 2d 792 (N.D. Cal. 1998).

37118 S. Ct. 1708
3 6Id. at 1711.
39

(1998).

1d.

4°id.
41
4

1d.

2ld.
3

Id.

4Id.

45Id.
4Id.

'U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
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seizure. A seizure, according to the Supreme Court, occurs only
when the government terminates an individual's freedom of
movement through means intentionally applied.4 The flashing
police lights and the commands to stop amounted to an attempted
seizure. However, an unsuccessful seizure does not implicate the
Fourth Amendment. 9 The accident was not a seizure because the
means were not intentionally applied by the sheriffs.4' Therefore,
without a Fourth Amendment claim, only substantive due process
remained.
The Supreme Court in recent years has suggested, over and over
again, that substantive due process is not exactly favored by the
present Court.' The Court is disenchanted with the fact that the
doctrine does not find support in the text of the Constitution nor are
there sufficient guidelines and standards for responsible decision
making. There may also be a sentiment that plaintiffs assert
substantive due process claims as a last resort because plaintiffs can
not find anything else in the text of the Constitution to support their
actions. This theme of negativism about substantive due process
was expressed very clearly in Lewis. 2
The critical issue in Lewis was: what is the due process standard
for evaluating the constitutionality of high speed pursuits? Over the
last ten to twelve years there has been a proliferation of these cases
all around the country. Sometimes it is an innocent bystander who
is injured, and sometimes it is a passenger, as in the Lewis case.
These cases have shown up all over the country except in New
York. The only thing I can think of is - "New York City traffic."
Maybe it is just not possible to have a high speed pursuit chase in
New York City.

but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
4
8Brower
49

v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989).
See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
5°Lewis,
118 S. Ct. at 1715.
51
Id.at 1714.
52
Id.
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The Court in Lewis held that the governing substantive due
process test is the "shocks the conscience" test. So a police pursuit
will violate substantive due process only when it is shocking to the
conscience.' That in turn raised another question, when will a
police pursuit be found to be conscience shocking? The Court held
that "[olnly a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate
object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct
shocking to the conscience necessary for a due process violation."-'
The key words in that phrase are "purpose to cause harm." That
standard is so rigorous that very few plaintiffs' lawyers are going to
be asserting substantive due process claims in pursuit situations.
After all, how are plaintiffs' lawyers going to be able to show that
police officers acted with a purpose to cause harm.
Remember that these situations typically involve rapidly evolving,
tense circumstances calling for split second judgment. For that
reason, it is going to be almost impossible to show a purpose to
cause harm. Under this test, it is not enough to show that the
police officer made a bad decision, an ill-advised decision, a foolish
decision, or even a stupid decision. The officer must act with a
purpose to cause harm. This standard is virtually impossible for
plaintiffs to overcome. So that means that in pursuit cases,
plaintiffs will have to look to state law for protection.
I have just done an initial look at this, but I do not think that
plaintiffs get much protection under state law in this context either.
There is a footnote in Lewis that makes the point that a pendent
state law claim asserted in the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed
by the district judge on the basis of California's immunity law.Some states like California give police officers immunity from
liability in pursuit situations.m I looked at the New York standard.
In New York, the plaintiff would have to show that the police
officer acted with a reckless disregard for the safety of others.1
53

d. at
54d. at
MId. at
56
1d. at
57

1717.
1711-12.
1712.
1714.

See Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 664 N.E.2d 988, 991, 620

N.Y.S.2d 297, 300 (1994).
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Again, that is a tough standard. It is not as rigorous as purpose to
cause harm, but nevertheless, very difficult to overcome.
The Lewis decision is important far beyond the pursuit situation.
The Court made some very important statements and sent out very
important messages about the meaning and application of
substantive due process. First, the Court stated that substantive due
process claims should be analyzed differently depending on whether
the challenge is to legislative action as opposed to executive
action.' As far as I can tell this is a holding of first impression.
Moreover, the Court said that the "shocks the conscience" test
applies only in challenges to executive action.59 This, too, I think,
is a holding of first impression. The Court used the physicianassisted suicide cases as an example, and said that when the
substantive due process challenge is to legislative action, the critical
issue is whether history and tradition supports recognition of an
implied fundamental constitutionally protected right that would
invoke heightened judicial scrutiny.w0 Conversely, when the
challenge is to executive action, the critical question is whether the
enforcement authority's conduct was so egregious that it could be
said to be conscience shocking.
The other important message that the Court gave us concerning
substantive due process, and again, I think that this is a holding of
first impression, is that different types of executive actions call for
different types of "shocks the conscience" evaluations. 6 Where
officials have a realistic opportunity to deliberate, for example, in
the provision of medical care to arrestees, a failure to deliberate
might be conscience shocking. 62 On the other hand, where there is
no realistic opportunity for deliberation, as in a high speed pursuit
situation, or prison guards' use of force, deliberate indifference is
not the appropriate inquiry.6
The critical question becomes

"Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1716-17.
59id.

6°Id. at 1716. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
61Id. at 1719.
62

1d. See, e.g., City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S.
239 (1983).
6ld. at 1718.
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whether the official acted with a purpose or intent to cause harm."
This standard goes to the subjective intent of a particular official. I
think that what the Court is doing is giving greater substantive due
process protections to officials who have to make these tense, split
second decisions than to officials who, in fact, have an opportunity
to deliberate.
The Lewis Court has added some content to the "shocks the
conscience" standard. The standard has often been the subject of
ridicule since it is totally subjective, whose conscience is it any
way? What we are beginning to see, and it is pretty much for the
first time, are judicial standards being formulated to implement the
shocks the conscience test.
III. PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
Prosecutors are protected by absolute immunity, but only for
carrying out their prosecutorial and advocacy functions.'
Therefore, a prosecutor's decision whether or not to prosecute, trial
preparation, and the prosecutor's conduct at the trial, are all
protected by absolute immunity.' On the other hand, when a
prosecutor acts as an investigative official or administrator, absolute
immunity does not apply. ' It is another way of saying to the
prosecutors, if you act like a detective, we will treat you like a
detective. The problem here is that the line is not always easy to
administer, and sometimes it is not obvious. Courts must ask what
is the nature of the prosecutor's conduct - is she acting as an
advocate or as a detective?
The Supreme Court's decision in Kahna v. Fletczers illustrates
some of the fine lines that are drawn in this area. The prosecutor in
Ka/ina commenced a criminal proceeding by filing three documents
- an information, a motion for an arrest warrant, and a sworn
"id.

'Kalina

v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 506-07 (1997).

See, e.g., Imbler v.

Patchman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
6Id.
6

Id. at 507. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993).

6' 118

S. Ct. 502 (1997).
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certificate that supported the motion for a warrant - and
summarized the evidence in support of the criminal charge." With
respect to the first two documents, the information and the motion
for an arrest warrant, there was no question that these are clearly
part of the advocacy function, and, as such, are protected by
absolute immunity.
The Supreme Court ruled that the third document, the sworn
certificate, was not part of the advocacy function. 7 The sworn
certificate is analogous to something that a complaining witness
would do. Using the functional approach, the Court has held that
complaining witnesses do not receive absolute immunity, but only
qualified immunity." Interestingly enough, the Court could have
looked at this as one package and said it was all part of the
advocacy function, since attorneys often draft affidavits and prepare
their own affirmations. The Court, however, looked at each
document separately in order to determine whether absolute
immunity should apply.7
IV. LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY
The other absolute immunity decision was Bogan v. Scott-

Harris,7 a decision involving legislative immunity. In that case,
the city enacted an ordinance that eliminated the plaintiff's
employment position. 74 The plaintiff had been the administrator of
the Department of Health and Human Services for the City of Fall
River, Massachusetts, and her position was eliminated by the
enactment of the ordinance.75 She sued the city, which was not a
party to the action in the Supreme Court, a city council member,
and the mayor in federal court under Section 1983. She alleged
that the actions leading to the enactment of the ordinance were
racially motivated and designed to retaliate against her for the
69Id.

7Id.
at 509-10.
71
1d. at 508. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
72d. at 505-06.
73 118 S. Ct. 966 (1998).
74
1d. at 969.
75
id.
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exercise of her free speech rights. The Supreme Court held that
the vote by the city council member, and the mayor's signing the
ordinance into law, were protected by absolute legislative
immunity.
I see three important rulings here. The first is that local
legislative officials, like state legislative officials, may be entitled to
claim absolute legislative immunity . ' I think that follows rather
obviously under the functional approach that the Court takes on
immunity issues, but this is a holding of first impression. It is the
first time the United States Supreme Court has held that local
legislative officials can claim absolute legislative immunity.
The second important ruling is that absolute legislative immunity
protects legislative acts, and that the motive or intent of the
legislative official is irrelevant.Y It does not matter whether the
official acted in subjective bad faith, or as claimed in this case, with
racial animosity or an intent to retaliate for the plaintiff's exercise
of her right to free speech. It is irrelevant. That means that the
district court was wrong in submitting these issues to the jury.
The third important ruling is that legislation which abolishes an
employment position is a legislative act even if the immediate effect
of that abolition is felt only by one human being. The Court
rejected plaintiff's argument that it was not a legislative act because
it only affected her. 0 The elimination of the plaintiff's employment
position was part of setting budgetary priorities. The local
legislative body went through a legislative process, and the
elimination of the position may have prospective implications."'
It is important to point out that if the City of Fall River had gotten
rid of the plaintiff, not by abolishing her employment position, but
by actually having her fired, absolute immunity would not apply,
because hiring and firing are clearly executive and administrative in
nature. This would be true whether the legislative officials did it
themselves or had some agency head do it. In such a situation
76Id"

at 973.
7Id. at 972.
7'd. at 972-73.
go Id. at 973.
77Id.

81

Id.
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qualified immunity would apply. So the decision in Bogan could be
seen as a way that local legislative officials can get rid of a
particular employee, and yet be protected by absolute immunity.
The question now becomes whether there are any limits to this
immunity? What if the local legislative body eliminates the
plaintiffs employment position and, three days later, reenacts the
ordinance and recreates the position? Maybe the new legislation
calls the position something else, but it is really the same position.
Does that matter? If you read the opinion strictly it would not
matter because the intent or motivation of the legislative officials is
irrelevant under legislative immunity.'
V. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
I think that the most important litigation messages were sent by
the Supreme Court in the area of qualified immunity. This is the
most recurrent issue in Section 1983 litigation. The key issue under
qualified immunity is whether the official violated clearly
established federal law.'
Going back to 1991, the Supreme Court in Siegert v. Gilley" said
that when qualified immunity is raised as a defense, the first issue
that a federal district court or circuit court should turn to is whether
the complaint states a violation of federally protected rights." The
thinking is that f the complaint does not state a violation of
federally protected rights, then there is no need to deal with the
qualified immunity defense. However, the Supreme Court has not
always been consistent in following Siegert,86 and not surprisingly,
neither have the lower courts. In Lewis, Justice Souter stated that
the "better approach" was to follow the Seigert methodology.'
Again, the Seigert methodology says that federal courts should first
ask if the complaint states a violation of federally protected rights,
at 972-73.
'Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
84500 U.S. 226 (1991).
"'Id.
at 232.
86
See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991).
*7County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1714 n.5 (1998).
'Id.
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and only if it does should the court go to the next step and ask
whether those rights were clearly established.
Justice Souter made an important observation here. He stated,
and Judge Pratt has been saying this for years, that if the federal
courts routinely go to the qualified immunity defense first, it is
going to become very difficult for constitutional standards
governing official conduct to be resolved. We will no longer have
constitutional rules; we will only have rulings as to whether
officials violated clearly established federal law. Nevertheless,
Justice Souter stated only that Megert was the "better approach. "
It was not set forth as an ironclad rule. So lower courts will
probably feel that they still have a certain amount of discretion to
go directly to the qualified immunity defense first where it makes
institutional decision making sense to do so.
The difficult qualified immunity issues have arisen when the facts
are in dispute. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that
qualified immunity should be decided early in the litigation as a
matter of law.89 The difficult question is what to do when the facts
are in dispute. After all, how can a court tell whether or not the
law was clearly established if the facts are in dispute? One must
first know what the material facts are. And, there is a closely
related problem. Qualified immunity is based on an objective
reasonableness standard. It is a defense that is not concerned with
the subjective motive or intent of the official who has been sued.
However, the very nature of some constitutional claims, like racial
discrimination or free speech retaliation, implicate the defendant's
motive or intent. There is, therefore, a tension between the nature
of the plaintiffs constitutional claim and the nature of the qualified
immunity defense.
This issue came before the Supreme Court last term in
Crawford-El v. Britton.90 Brfitton concerned a free speech
retaliation claim asserted by a prisoner. 9' The big issue was how
the qualified immunity defense should be handled when the
8 Id.
' See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991).
90 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998).
91
1d. at 1587.
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constitutional claim implicates the defendant official's motive or
2
intent.
For years, the lower federal courts were very concerned that
plaintiffs might, simply by alleging a discrimination claim or a free
speech retaliation claim, be able to move the case out of the
summary judgment stage into the discovery stage, and perhaps to
trial as well. The courts started to impose special burdens upon
plaintiffs in these cases in order to protect officials who asserted
qualified immunity because, after all, qualified immunity is not just
immunity from liability, but immunity from having to defend the
case at all."
Some courts imposed heightened pleading burdens,94 and others a
heightened production burden. 9 At one point, the District of
Columbia Circuit, which has been the most extreme Circuit on this
issue, required that the plaintiff produce direct evidence of a
retaliatory motive in order to defeat a summary judgment qualified
immunity motion. 6 One district court pointed out that this
approach makes no sense at all, because what you are doing is
making the plaintiff produce more evidence at the summary
judgment stage than the plaintiff would be required to produce at
trial.97 After all, there is no general requirement to introduce direct
evidence at trial.
The District of Columbia Circuit got rid of the direct evidence
rule, but then formulated a new rule which was the subject of last
term's decision in Crawford-El v. Britton.' The new rule provided
that when a plaintiff asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim,
id.
'Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
94 See IB MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983
LrrTGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES §§ 9.21, 9.33 (3d ed. 1997).
9"Id. at § 9.34.
96Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993), reh. en banc denied,
17 F.3d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2552
(1995).
97 Vemey v. Dodaro, 872 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 79 F. 3d
1140 (1996).
98 Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and
remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998).
9
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subject to qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to
produce clear and convincing evidence of retaliatory motive.'
The United States Supreme Court in Crawford-EI, in a five to four
decision, held that the District of Columbia Circuit's clear and
convincing evidence rule was invalid.100 The Court reasoned that
'
the rule is not authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 01
The message sent to the federal courts is, do not rewrite the federal
rules. Furthermore, the majority viewed the District of Columbia
Circuit rule as imposing an unduly harsh burden on plaintiffs who
might have meritorious claims, and might prevent those claims
from getting to trial. 112 Finally, the Court said that there are several
mechanisms available to district court judges to deal with frivolous
claims."0 ' Therefore, the message is that when a district court judge
receives a summary judgment qualified immunity motion that is
addressed to a First Amendment retaliation claim, and I think you
can say by extension to a discrimination claim that implicates the
defendant's intent, she should apply normal summary judgment
rules and not impose special burdens upon plaintiffs. I'l4

The decision in Crawford-El placed a lot of emphasis upon the
wide discretion afforded to district judges. The decision is also
filled with numerous procedural details. It reads like a manual for
district court judges on qualified immunity.
I think that what is most significant about Crawford-El is that it is
the first time that the United States Supreme Court has attempted to
treat qualified immunity in a realistic litigation fashion. It is the
first time that the Supreme Court has recognized that it is necessary
to know the facts in order to determine if an official has violated
clearly established federal law, and if those facts are in dispute then
it is necessary first to get those factual disputes resolved. Prior to
Crawford-El, the Supreme Court acted as if lower courts could
magically make factual disputes disappear, treating qualified
99Id. at 1592.
'1001 .d,
at 1590.
1d. at 1595.
0 2Id.
'0 ' Id.

at 1589-90.
at 1594.
14Id. at 1595.
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immunity as a question of law early in the litigation. So, there is a
shift from qualified immunity magic to qualified immunity reality.
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